

Continuity of Operations Plan
for
State of Alaska
Division of Homeland Security and
Emergency Management



2014

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COOP PLAN APPROVALS

This Continuity of Operations (COOP) Plan describes the methods and processes the Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management will use when events occur that cause the Division to implement this plan.

This plan is considered a living document and should be continuously updated and revised to reflect lessons learned during exercises and actual incidents.

As Director of the Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management for the State of Alaska, I approve the Division's COOP Plan.

Approved:  Date: 6/24/2014

John W. Madden, Director

I. Executive Summary

The State of Alaska Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management's (DHS&EM or the Division hereafter) mission is to be prepared, to the greatest extent possible, to respond to all-hazard disasters and events. DHS&EM has become increasingly aware of events that could interrupt or potentially destroy its ability to effectively perform essential functions in its current location in the National Guard Armory, Joint Base Elmendorf Richardson, Alaska. As an organization whose mission is to be prepared for unexpected events, DHS&EM determined that it should develop and maintain a Continuity of Operations (COOP) Plan. COOP planning is designed to develop and maintain a program that preserves, maintains and reconstitutes DHS&EM's ability to function effectively in or potential disasters.

The DHS&EM COOP Plan includes a Concept of Operations that details three distinct phases of a COOP event. Phase I is the recognition of a COOP event and the activation of the plan. This activation may include relocation of staff and resources in order to accomplish those tasks determined to be mission essential. Phase II of the COOP Plan provides for the ongoing provision of mission essential functions (MEFs) until the COOP event is complete. The third and final phase, Phase III, is the reconstitution phase that allows DHS&EM to return to normal operations in a systematic manner. Each phase in the plan is supported through a rigorous and detailed analysis of the operational requirements to execute the phase. The COOP Plan also includes supporting appendices that provide operational checklists, communication protocols, decision matrices, and alternate facility details.

The COOP Plan ensures the continuation of the MEFs and the ability to keep the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) operational at any location. The objectives of this plan are to allow DHS&EM to provide life and property saving services by reducing disruption of operations; protecting essential equipment, records, and other assets; minimizing damage; providing organizational and operational stability; facilitating decision making during an emergency; and achieving an orderly recovery. While DHS&EM performs many important functions, this plan only covers those that are mission and time critical.

II. Introduction

DHS&EM has grown increasingly aware of how events can disrupt operations and jeopardize the safety of DHS&EM personnel and partners. Emergency planning, including COOP planning, has become a necessary and required process within the Division.

The all-hazards approach to COOP planning ensures that regardless of the event, mission essential functions and services will continue to operate and be provided in some capacity. This approach includes preparing for natural, man-made, or technological emergencies.

The Division is committed to the safety and protection of its personnel, partners, and visitors. This plan provides a framework that is designed to minimize potential impact during an event.

III. Purpose, Scope, Assumptions, and Objectives

A. Purpose

DHS&EM provides critical services to the citizens of Alaska, focusing on protecting lives and property from all hazards and terrorism as well as facilitating rapid recovery from all disasters. To accomplish this mission, DHS&EM must ensure its operations are performed efficiently with minimal disruption, especially during an emergency. This document provides planning and program guidance to ensure the Division is capable of accomplishing its mission under all threats and conditions. While the severity and consequences of an emergency cannot be predicted, effective contingency planning can minimize the impact on the Division's mission, personnel, and facilities.

The overall purpose of COOP planning is to ensure continuity of DHS&EM's MEFs and other identified essential functions under all conditions. The fluid threat environment and recent events, including acts of nature, accidents, technological emergencies, and military or terrorist attacks, have increased the need for viable continuity of operations capabilities and plans that enable agencies to continue their essential functions across a wide spectrum of possibilities.

B. Scope

This plan applies to all DHS&EM personnel in all sections where essential functions are conducted. It also applies to the array of events and hazards that could threaten DHS&EM's ability to perform MEFs, including the activation and operation of the SEOC.

This plan covers all systems, vehicles, and areas occupied by DHS&EM. The plan supports the performance of MEFs from continuity facilities to continuity of management and decision-making in the event senior leadership or technical personnel are unavailable.

Events and hazards referenced in this plan include natural and intentional or non-intentional man-made events adversely affecting the ability of the Division to perform its essential functions. Natural hazards are those where the occurrence is beyond control, including earthquakes, floods, ice storms, severe winter weather, and external fires. Intentional man-made hazards are beyond the direct control of DHS&EM and could include events such as external sabotage and terrorism. Non-intentional man-made events such as power outages, fires, explosions, equipment failures, or human errors may not be within the control of the Division. Any of these events could lead to loss of physical space, reduction in workforce, or loss of critical support services leading to the partial or complete activation of the COOP Plan.

This plan does not apply to temporary disruptions of service including minor IT system or power outages or to any scenarios where essential functions can be readily restored in the primary facility.

C. Planning Assumptions

1. A major emergency or COOP event could happen at any time.
2. Emergencies or threats may adversely affect DHS&EM's ability to continue to support essential functions and provide services and support to clients and external agencies. The cause of DHS&EM's inability to continue delivery of services can include loss of physical space, reduction or loss of personnel, or loss of internal or external support services.
3. Personnel and other resources from the Division and other organizations outside the area affected by the emergency or threat will be made available, if required, to continue essential operations.
4. Mobile communications capabilities will be used in the interim to ensure direction and control of the COOP activation and relocation until interoperable communications can be established at the alternate site.
5. An emergency condition may require immediate activation of the COOP Plan and the relocation of select personnel to a designated alternate site.
6. The DHS&EM COOP Plan is to be used jointly with the State of Alaska's Emergency Operations Plan.

D. Objectives

1. Ensure DHS&EM can perform its MEFs and other identified essential functions under all conditions.
2. Reduce loss of life and minimize loss and damage to property.
3. Implement order of succession with accompanying authorities in the event a disruption renders regular leadership unavailable, unable, or incapable of assuming and performing the authorities and responsibilities of office.
4. Reduce or mitigate disruptions to operations.
5. Ensure DHS&EM has facilities where it can continue to perform its MEFs and other identified essential functions during a COOP event.
6. Protect essential facilities, equipment, records, and other assets in the event of a disruption.
7. Achieve timely and orderly recovery and reconstitution from an event.
8. Ensure and validate continuity readiness through a dynamic and integrated continuity test, training, and exercise (TT&E) program and operational capability testing.

IV. Authorities and References

Authorities

- Alaska Statute, Title 26, Chapter 23
- Federal Continuity Directive 1 (FCD 1), February, 2008
- Federal Continuity Directive 2 (FCD 2), February, 2008
- National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 51/Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 20 May, 2007

References

- National Preparedness Directorate's Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, *Developing and Maintaining State, Territorial, Tribal, and Local Government Emergency Plans*, March 2012
- FEMA Continuity Guidance Circular 1 (CGC 1), *Continuity Guidance for Non-Federal Agencies*, January 2009
- FEMA Continuity Guidance Circular 2 (CGC 2) *Continuity Guidance for Non-Federal Entities: Mission Essential Functions Identification Process*, July 22, 2010
- Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Headquarters Continuity of Operations (COOP) Guidance Document, April 2004
- Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), COOP template
- Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) Standard, April 2006
- National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1600, December 2006
- State of Alaska, *Emergency Operations Plan*, 2013
- State of Alaska, *All-Hazard Mitigation Plan*, October 2013
- State of Alaska, Division of Public Health, *Pandemic Influenza Response Plan*, February 2008
- Municipality of Anchorage, *All-Hazard Mitigation Plan*, March 2011
- Matanuska Susitna Borough, *All-Hazard Mitigation Plan*, August 2013
- Enstar Natural Gas Company, *Emergency Operations Plan*, 2008
- Municipal Light and Power (ML&P), *Emergency Plan*, 2007

V. Essential Functions and Continuity Support

A. Identification of Essential Functions

DHS&EM completed the process of identifying functions and activities that must continue under any and all circumstances.

To identify, prioritize, and document essential functions, DHS&EM first identified all Division functions and reviewed which were directed by applicable laws, executive orders, and other directives.

Upon identifying all functions, DHS&EM identified the Mission Essential Functions (MEFs). MEFs are a limited set of agency-level functions that must be continued throughout, or resumed rapidly after, a disruption of normal activities.

DHS&EM's functions are prioritized based on recovery time objectives (RTOs). An RTO is an estimate of the maximum tolerable duration between a disruption occurring and function resuming under emergency conditions. The following classification system was used to prioritize the essential functions:

- 1: Emergency response functions (0-2 hours)
- 2: High impact on public health or safety (up to 24 hours)
- 3: High impact on public safety and health, or on department critical operations (up to 72 hours)
- 4: Moderate impact on public safety, health or department critical operations (1-3 weeks)
- 5: Low Impact (3 weeks or longer)

Essential functions that are prioritized as 1 or 2 are considered MEFs. Essential functions prioritized as 3, 4, or 5 will resume as time and personnel allow.

The following table shows the MEFs and essential functions identified by DHS&EM subsequent to Alaska Statute, Title 26, Chapter 23, Section 040.

Division/ Section	Function	Mission Essential Function	Essential Function	Priority (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
DHS&EM Operations	Provide 24/7 Statewide answering point services	X		1
DHS&EM Operations	Provide 24/7 warning point services	X		1
DHS&EM Operations	Provide command, control, and coordination of Statewide Disaster Response operations	X		1
DHS&EM Plans	Staffing support for SEOC	X		1
DHS&EM Plans	Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources Intelligence sharing	X		1
DHS&EM Preparedness	Staffing support for SEOC	X		1
DHS&EM Disaster Assistance	Staffing support for the SEOC	X		1
DHS&EM Disaster Assistance, Plans, Preparedness	Support for essential functions across the Division	X		2
DHS&EM Disaster Assistance	Coordination and provision of training	X		2
DHS&EM Preparedness	Staffing support for Immediate housing needs	X		2
DHS&EM Disaster Assistance	Staffing support for temporary housing		X	3
DHS&EM Plans	Plan and conduct SVA		X	3
DHS&EM Plans	Plan and conduct all hazards planning		X	4
DHS&EM Plans	Plan and conduct hazard mitigation planning		X	4
DHS&EM Preparedness	Plan and conduct training		X	4
DHS&EM Preparedness	Plan and conduct exercises		X	4
DHS&EM Preparedness	Plan and conduct outreach		X	4
DHS&EM Preparedness	Plan and conduct preparedness activities		X	4
DHS&EM Administration	Payroll data entry		X	4

B. Vital Records Identification

Vital records are information systems and applications, electronic and hardcopy documents, references, and records, to include classified or sensitive data, needed to support MEFs and other

identified essential functions during a COOP event. DHS&EM has incorporated its vital records program into the overall continuity program, plans, and procedures.

DHS&EM's official vital records program:

- Identifies and protects records that specify how DHS&EM will operate in an emergency or disaster
- Identifies records necessary for continuing operations
- Identifies records needed to protect the legal and financial rights of the government and citizens

As soon as possible after activation of the continuity plan, but in all cases within 12 hours of activation, continuity personnel at the continuity facility must have access to the appropriate media for accessing vital records, including:

- A local area network
- Electronic versions of vital records
- Supporting information systems and data
- Internal and external email and email archives
- Hard copies of vital records

C. Continuity Communications

DHS&EM identified available and redundant critical communication systems that are located at, or can be transported to, the assigned continuity facility. Further, DHS&EM maintains fully capable continuity communications that could support needs during all events, to include pandemic and other related emergencies. The Division gave full consideration to supporting social distancing operations including telework and other virtual offices. These systems provide the ability to communicate within and outside the event response and are found in Annex B, Continuity Communications of this plan.

D. Human Capital

1. Continuity Personnel

During a continuity event, key staff will be activated by DHS&EM to perform assigned response duties.

DHS&EM has:

- Identified and designated positions judged to be critical to operations in any given emergency situation as continuity personnel. A roster of these positions is maintained by the Operations Section in the SEOC.

- Identified and documented its continuity personnel. These personnel possess the skill sets necessary to perform essential functions and supporting tasks. A roster of these personnel is maintained by the Operations Section in the SEOC.
- Informed all continuity personnel of their roles or designations by providing documentation in the form of SEOC Position Checklists to ensure that continuity personnel know and accept their roles and responsibilities. Copies of this documentation are maintained by the Operations Section in the SEOC.
- Ensured continuity personnel participate in the continuity TT&E program, as reflected in training records. Training records are maintained by the Preparedness Section.
- Provided guidance to continuity personnel on individual preparedness measures using training and preparedness information provided by the American Red Cross and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Copies of this guidance are available at <http://www.redcross.org> and at <http://www.ready.gov>.

2. All Staff

DHS&EM will keep all employees, especially individuals not identified as continuity personnel, informed and accounted for during a continuity event. DHS&EM has established procedures for contacting and accounting for all employees in the event of an emergency.

- Employees are expected to remain in contact with program managers and supervisors during any closure or relocation situation. Employees can contact supervisors using any means available.
- DHS&EM ensures staff is aware of and familiar with human capital guidance in order to continue essential functions during an emergency. DHS&EM uses the following methods to increase awareness:
 - Employee orientation briefings
 - Training and exercises

An event that requires the activation of the COOP Plan may personally affect DHS&EM staff. Therefore, DHS&EM has created provisions and procedures to assist all staff, especially those who are disaster victims, with special human capital concerns following a catastrophic disaster.

3. Human Capital Considerations

DHS&EM's continuity program, plans, and procedures incorporate existing agency-specific guidance and direction for human capital management, including guidance on pay, leave, benefits, telework, hiring, authorities, flexibility, and work scheduling. The State of Alaska Department of Administration, Division of Personnel has responsibility for human capital issues. A copy of these policies and guidance is found on the Division of Personnel's website at <http://dop.state.ak.us>.

E. Continuity Facilities Identification

DHS&EM has designated continuity facilities and prepared continuity personnel for the possibility of unannounced relocation to these sites if needed. These continuity facilities provide the following at sufficient quantities to sustain operations for up to 30 days or until normal business activities can be resumed:

1. Sufficient space and equipment, including computer equipment and software either on site or transportable from the primary facility.
2. Capability to perform MEFs within 12 hours of plan activation or an event.
3. Reliable logistical support, services, and infrastructure systems.
4. Consideration for health, safety, security, and emotional well-being of personnel.
5. Interoperable communications for effective interaction either on site or transportable.
6. Capability to access and use vital records.
7. Systems and configurations used in daily activities.
8. Emergency/back-up power capability.

Detailed information for each continuity facility and its capabilities are located in Annex C of this plan.

VI. Risk Analysis and Vulnerability Assessment

A. Risk Analysis

A risk analysis was conducted to develop a list of hazards of such significance they are reasonably likely to cause devastating harm to DHS&EM's main facility and/or interrupt operations if the hazards are not effectively controlled. The objective of this analysis is to identify vulnerabilities in operations and take steps to mitigate losses and/or develop recovery strategies.

These risks are categorized into three groups:

1. Natural hazards such as earthquakes, floods, and winter storms;
2. Human-related hazards or technological events resulting from negligence or human error in managing and operating infrastructure such as electrical power failures, transportation failures, and communications systems failures;
3. Human-related hazards reflecting deliberate actions to cause harm such as workplace violence, bomb threats, or civil disturbances.

Annex D details the results of the COOP risk analysis on the primary facility based on the above three categories of risk.

B. Vulnerability Assessment

A vulnerability assessment was used to survey or scan the environment for possible risks identified above and translate that environment into a set of risk scenarios. As a result of this assessment the following scenarios have been developed and applied to the primary facility and continuity facilities:

1. Local facility disruptions;
2. Access to Joint Base Elmendorf Richardson (JBER) restricted or eliminated;
3. Region-wide disruptions affecting all or many government buildings in the region;
4. Disruption of a communications system;
5. Disruption of access to vital records or databases;
6. Disruption to availability of specialized equipment or systems, including computing systems (other than traditional communications systems);
7. Loss of services from a vendor or another government agency;
8. Unavailability of personnel.

Annex D details the results for the vulnerability assessment conducted on the primary facility.

VII. Concept of Operations

This COOP Plan will be maintained at a high level of preparedness and is ready to be implemented without prior warning. The plan should be fully implemented no later than 12 hours after activation and provide guidance to sustain operations for up to 30 days. The broad objective of this COOP Plan is to provide for the safety and well-being of DHS&EM's employees. In addition, this plan will facilitate the execution of the Division's essential functions during any crisis or emergency in which the National Guard Armory is threatened or not accessible.

Any event affecting DHS&EM's ability to perform its essential functions from the SEOC may require the partial or complete activation of this plan. There are three types of continuity events that can trigger a partial or complete activation of this COOP Plan based on the risk analysis and vulnerability assessment:

- Loss of access to the facility such as a structure fire, JBER base closure, or area-wide disaster;
- Loss of services due to a reduced workforce such as in a pandemic situation;
- Loss of services due to internal or external equipment or systems failure such as in a major utility or information technology failure.

A. Phase I: Activation and Relocation

COOP Plan activation and relocation are scenario-driven processes allowing flexible and scalable responses to the full spectrum of possible events. COOP Plan activation is not required for all emergencies and disruptive situations, since other actions may be deemed appropriate. The plan is flexible in its implementation based upon projected or actual impact.

The activation and relocation phase includes the following activities:

- Occurrence or threat of an event.
- Review, analysis, and decision to activate the continuity plan.
- Alert and notification of continuity personnel.
- Relocation to continuity facilities, if necessary.
- Accountability analysis of continuity of operations personnel.
- Identification of available leadership.
- Determination and reporting of operational capabilities.
- Reconstitution planning.

1. Decision Process

Based on the type and severity of the situation, the COOP Plan may be activated by one of the following methods:

1. The director or designee may initiate the COOP Plan for the entire division, based on an emergency or threat.
2. The SEOC Operations Section or duty officer can initiate the COOP Plan for the SEOC based on loss of access, damage, or system failure.
3. The Operations Section can initiate the COOP Plan for DHS&EM’s offices based on loss of access, damage, or system failure.

Responsible parties may use the matrix below to assist in the decision to activate the continuity plan.

Decision Matrix for Continuity Plan Implementation		
	Duty Hours	Non-Duty Hours
Event With Warning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assess situation and impact on personnel, facility, and MEFs. • Determine the status of the primary facility for continued access/use. • Implement COOP Plan if impact on personnel, facility, and/or delivery of MEFs is compromised. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gather intelligence and assess the situation. • Determine the impact of the event on the primary facility for continued access/use. • Assess the impact on personnel and the delivery of MEFs. • Implement COOP Plan if impact on personnel, facility, and/or delivery of MEFs is compromised
Event Without Warning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assess situation and impact on personnel, facility, and MEFs. • Determine the status of the primary facility for continued access/use. • Implement COOP Plan if impact on personnel, facility, and/or delivery of MEFs is compromised. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gather intelligence and assess the situation. • Determine the impact of the event on the primary facility for continued access/use. • Assess the impact on personnel and the delivery of MEFs. • Implement COOP Plan if impact on personnel, facility, and/or delivery of MEFs is compromised


As the decision authority, the director of DHS&EM will be kept informed of the threat environment using all available means including official government intelligence reports, national/local reporting channels, and news media. The director of DHS&EM will evaluate all available information relating to:

- Direction and guidance from higher authorities.
- Health and safety of personnel.
- Ability to execute MEFs.
- Changes in readiness or advisory levels.
- Intelligence reports.
- Potential or actual effects on communication systems, information systems, office facilities, and other vital equipment.
- Expected duration of the emergency situation.

2. Activation Procedures during Duty Hours

Depending upon the situation, activation tasks and actions during duty hours may include:


- Activate occupant emergency plans.
- Assess the impact to the facility, SEOC, staff offices, and personnel.
- Notify DHS&EM management if the SEOC or occupied staff offices are deemed unusable and MEFs cannot be supported at the existing facility.
- Activate and deploy available staff to an assembly area or an available continuity facility.
- Notify all DHS&EM personnel of the activation of the continuity plan and provide additional guidance.
- Taking appropriate measures to ensure security of the facilities and equipment or records remaining in the vacated building by designated security personnel.



3. Activation Procedures during Non-Duty Hours

Depending upon the situation, activation tasks and actions during non-duty hours may include:

- Notify DHS&EM management that an emergency requiring COOP activation is anticipated or underway.
- Assess ability to continue performing MEFs based on impact to facility, SEOC, staff offices, and personnel.
- Activate the COOP Plan once situation is confirmed.
- If the facility, SEOC, and staff offices are deemed unusable, DHS&EM management is notified followed by the staff and the process of relocating to a continuity facility begins.
- Available DHS&EM continuity personnel are activated and deployed to an assembly area or the continuity location as appropriate.
- Personnel who do not have COOP responsibilities are notified and provided with further guidance concerning this event.



4. Alert and Notification Procedures

DHS&EM maintains plans and procedures for communicating and coordinating activities with personnel before, during, and after a continuity event.

Prior to an event, personnel in DHS&EM must monitor advisory information, including the Alaska Threat Level, SEOC Activation Level, DHS Homeland Security Advisory System, the Federal Government Response Stages for Pandemic Influenza, and other key intelligence. In the event normal operations are interrupted or if an incident appears imminent, DHS&EM will take the following steps to communicate the Division's operating status with all staff:

- a. DHS&EM management will notify section managers of the event requiring continuity activation.
- b. Section managers will contact their staff of the event using existing notification procedures, including telephone, smart phone, pager, email, and radio.

Upon the decision to activate the continuity plan, DHS&EM will notify all Division personnel, as well as affected and interdependent agencies with information regarding continuity activation and relocation status, operational and communication status, and the anticipated duration of relocation. These entities include:

- Continuity facilities and on-site support teams
- All DHS&EM employees, both continuity personnel and non-deployed
- State of Alaska, Governor's Office
- DMVA Commissioner

Additionally, DHS&EM will notify the following agencies with information regarding continuity activation and relocation status, the continuity location, operational and communication status, and anticipated duration of relocation:

- The FEMA Region X Operations Center
- City of Wasilla Police Department Dispatch (MatComm)
- The National Guard Joint Operations Center (JOC)
- The National Weather Service Regional Operations Center
- The National Tsunami Warning Center
- The State of Alaska, Department of Public Safety
- The State of Alaska, Department of Health & Social Services
- The State of Alaska, Department of Environmental Conservation
- The State of Alaska, Department of Natural Resources, Division of Forestry
- The Alaska Railroad
- The Municipality of Anchorage, Office of Emergency Management
- The Kenai Peninsula Borough, Office of Emergency Management
- The Matanuska Susitna Borough, Office of Emergency Services
- The Fairbanks North Star Borough, Office of Emergency Management.

5. Relocation Process

Following activation of the plan and notification of personnel, DHS&EM must move personnel and vital records to a designated continuity facility. Upon activation, continuity personnel deploy to the assigned continuity facility to perform DHS&EM's MEFs and other continuity tasks.

Emergency procedures during duty hours are as follows:

- Continuity personnel will depart to the designated continuity facility from the primary operating facility. Division vehicles may be used for communications and transportation of personal, vital records, and equipment.
- Individuals who are not continuity personnel present at the primary operating facility or remote equipment storage locations at the time of an emergency notification will receive instructions from their supervisors and management.
- At the time of notification, any available information on departure routes and safety information will be shared.

Emergency procedures during non-duty hours are as follows:

- Continuity personnel will depart to assigned continuity facility from current location using private vehicle.
- Individuals who are not continuity personnel will wait for further instructions from supervisors or management.

Personnel not identified as continuity personnel may be required to replace or augment identified continuity personnel during activation. These activities will be coordinated by the Division on a case-by-case basis. Individuals who are not identified as continuity personnel will remain available to replace or augment continuity members.

In the event of an activation of the COOP Plan, DHS&EM may need to procure necessary personnel, equipment, and supplies not already in place for operations on an emergency basis. DHS&EM Administration and Logistics Sections maintain the authority for emergency procurement.

6. Direction and Control

During an activation of the COOP Plan, the Division Director maintains responsibility for direction and control. Should the director become unavailable or incapacitated, the organization will follow the directions laid out in the State of Alaska Emergency Operations Plan as outlined in the Concept of Operations Section.

a. Orders of Succession

Pre-identifying orders of succession is critical to ensure effective leadership during an emergency. In the event an incumbent is incapable or unavailable to fulfill essential duties, successors have been identified to ensure there is no lapse in essential decision-making authority.

The DHS&EM orders of succession are:

- At least three positions deep, where possible, ensuring sufficient depth to maintain the Division's ability to manage and direct essential functions and operations.
- Geographically dispersed, where feasible.
- Described by positions or titles, rather than by names of individuals holding those offices.
- Based on identified essential functions.

Orders of succession have been established for MEFs and other essential functions identified by the Division and are listed in Annex A – Essential Functions, Priority, Key Positions and Orders of Succession.

Function	Key Position	Designated Successors
Direction and Control	Director, Division Operations	Deputy Director, Division Operations
Response, SEOC	Operations Program Manager	Planning, Analysis, Mitigation Program Manager SEOC Manager Response Manager
Response, Declaration Process	Operations Program Manager	Disaster Assistance Program Manager Response Manager SEOC Manager
Disaster Assistance	Disaster Assistance Program Manager	Public Assistance EMS III Individual Assistance EMS III Senior SPAO EMS II
Operations	Operations Program Manager	SEOC Manager Response Manager Senior Operations
Planning, Analysis and Mitigation	Planning, Analysis, Mitigation Program Manager	Lead Planner Hazard Mitigation EMS III Security, Vulnerability, Analysis Planner
Preparedness	Preparedness Program Manager	Exercise Planner EMS III Training Supervisor EMS III Outreach EMS III
Program Support	Admin Officer 1	Deputy Director, Division Operations

b. Delegations of Authority

Generally, DHS&EM's pre-determined delegations of authority will take effect when normal channels of direction are disrupted and terminate when these channels have resumed.

During a continuity event, delegations of authority shall follow the SEOC's ICS/NIMS position diagram as established for use during SEOC activation.

B. Phase II: Continuity Operations

Upon activation of the COOP Plan, DHS&EM will continue to perform MEFs at the primary operating facility until ordered to cease operations by Division management. At that time, MEFs will transfer to the assigned continuity facility. The Division must perform identified MEFs within 12 hours of the event and other identified essential functions within 12 hours of plan activation.

As continuity personnel arrive at the assigned continuity facility, the SEOC Resources Unit (RSU), will in-process the staff to ensure accountability. In addition, the RSU will identify all organization key

personnel available at the continuity facility. Shortages of continuity personnel will be addressed at this time.

Upon arrival at the continuity facility, DHS&EM continuity personnel will:

- Report immediately for check-in and in-processing.
- Receive all applicable instructions and equipment.
- Report to their respective workspace as identified or as otherwise notified during the activation process and check-in process.
- Retrieve pre-positioned information and activate specialized systems or equipment if on site.
- Activate computer systems, establish links to critical systems.
- Establish communications: radio, telephonic, etc.
- Monitor the status of personnel and resources.
- Continue DHS&EM's MEFs.
- Prepare and disseminate instructions and reports, as required.

During continuity operations, DHS&EM may need to acquire additional personnel/contractors, equipment, and supplies on an emergency basis to sustain operations for up to 30 days or until normal operations can be resumed. The Division's Administration and Logistics Sections maintain the authority for emergency acquisition.

C. Phase III: Reconstitution

The process of moving from the relocation site to the old or new home site is generally the same as that of moving to the relocation site, in that its objective is to continue essential operations during the transition, have a smooth handoff from the relocation site to the designated home site, and make the move as safe and cost-effective as possible.

The objectives of reconstitution are:

- Develop an executable plan for transitioning back to efficient normal operations status from COOP status once a threat or disruption has passed.
- Coordinate and preplan options for organization reconstitution regardless of the level of disruption that originally prompted the Division to implement its COOP Plan. These options include moving operations from the continuity facility to either the original operating facility or a new operating facility.
- Outline the necessary procedures to conduct a smooth transition from the relocation site to either the original facility or a new facility.

1. Reconstitution Procedures

Within 12 hours of an emergency relocation, the following individuals will initiate and coordinate operations to salvage, restore, and recover DHS&EM's original operating facility after


receiving approval from appropriate local, state, and federal law enforcement and emergency services personnel:

- The Division’s Operations Section will appoint a representative to serve as the reconstitution manager for all phases of the reconstitution process.
- Each DHS&EM supervisor will designate a reconstitution point-of-contact to work with the reconstitution team and to update office personnel on developments regarding reconstitution. The supervisor will provide names of reconstitution points-of-contact to Operations Section within 12 hours of the COOP Plan activation.
- All Division managers will identify any records affected by the incident. DHS&EM will begin development of specialized vital records transition and recovery plan based on the incident and facility within 12 hours of plan activation.

2. Implementation

Reconstitution procedures will commence when the director or other authorized person ascertains that the emergency situation has ended and is unlikely to recur. These reconstitution plans are viable regardless of the level of disruption that originally prompted implementation of the COOP Plan. Once the appropriate DHS&EM authority has made this determination in coordination with other applicable authorities, one or a combination of the following options may be implemented:

- Continue to operate from the continuity facility
- Reconstitute DHS&EM to the original operating facility
- Begin to establish a reconstituted DHS&EM in a new facility



a. Relocation to the Original Facility

Prior to relocating to the original facility, DHS&EM's Operations Section will ensure that appropriate security, safety, and health assessments are conducted to determine building suitability. In addition, the Operations Section will verify that all critical systems, communications, and other required capabilities are available and fully operational so DHS&EM is capable of accomplishing all essential functions at the original facility.

Once the director of DHS&EM or designee has determined the original operating facility can be reoccupied, Division program managers will notify all staff of the actions required during the relocation process using telephone, smart phone, email, or other available notification system.

The Operations Section will begin supervising a return of continuity personnel, equipment, and documents to the original operating facility. The phase-down and return of personnel, functions, and equipment will be prioritized as follows:

- IT/communications
- SEOC operations
- Staff offices

The Division will continue to operate at the continuity facility until personnel, equipment, and documents are in place at the original facility. The Division's Operations program manager will order the continuity facility to cease operations and close the continuity facility. Once the move to the original facility is complete, notifications will be made to all affected and interdependent agencies with information regarding operational and communication status.

b. Relocation to a New Facility

Should it be determined that relocation to the original facility is not feasible, the Division will continue to operate at the continuity facility until a suitable facility is found. DHS&EM will develop space and facility requirements including security, health, access, communications, and computer support requirements. This information will be used to evaluate each facility.

DHS&EM will advise the Department of Administration and the Department of Transportation and Public Facilities of the need for a new facility, providing them with the above listed requirements. The Division will work in concert with those Departments to locate a new site and follow normal purchasing and/or leasing procedures to occupy the facility.

Upon verification that the required capabilities are available and operational at the new site, the Operations Section will begin supervising a return of personnel, equipment, and documents to the new location. The phase-down and return of personnel, functions, and equipment will be prioritized by:

- IT/communications
- SEOC operations
- Staff offices

The Division will continue to operate at the continuity facility until personnel, equipment, and documents are in place at the new facility. The Division's Operations program manager will order the continuity facility to cease operations and will close the continuity facility. Once the move to the new facility is complete, notifications will be made to all affected and interdependent agencies with information regarding operational and communication status.

3. After Action Report and Improvement Plan

DHS&EM will complete an After Action Report (AAR) once it is back in the primary operating facility or established in a new primary operating facility.

The Preparedness program manager has the responsibility for initiating and completing the AAR. All sections within the Division will have the opportunity to provide input to the AAR. This AAR will study the effectiveness of the continuity plans and procedures, identify areas for improvement, document these in the DHS&EM Improvement Plan (IP), and then develop a remedial action plan as soon as possible after the reconstitution.

The Operations program manager has the responsibility to document areas for improvement in the IP and develop a remedial action plan. In addition, the AAR will identify any records affected by the incident, and will work with all sections to ensure an effective transition or recovery of vital records and databases and other records not designated as vital records.

The AAR/IP will follow guidelines established by the Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP).

VIII. COOP planning Responsibilities

Responsibility	Position
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provides overall policy direction, guidance, and objectives for COOP planning. • Provides policy direction, guidance, and objectives during an incident for the implementation of the COOP Plan. • Consults with and advises appropriate officials during implementation of the COOP Plan. 	<p>Director or designee</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Serves as the COOP Plan point of contact. • Coordinates implementation of the COOP Plan and initiates appropriate internal and external notifications during COOP Plan implementation. • Keeps management informed of site vulnerabilities or changes in site resources that may impact the effective implementation of the COOP Plan. • Visits continuity sites on an annual basis to assure availability, confirm contact information, and inventory stored equipment/materials if any. • Initiates recovery as part of reconstitution. • Prepares COOP operational checklists, procedures and site support plans to support the implementation of the COOP Plan to facilitate the smooth transition of direction and operations from the existing facility to a continuity facility. • Coordinates implementation of the COOP Plan and initiates appropriate internal and external notifications during COOP Plan implementation. 	<p>Operations program manager or SEOC manager</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordinates COOP testing, training, and exercises. • Maintains COOP training records • Maintains COOP AAR/IP reports • Conducts COOP orientations 	<p>Exercise and Training manager</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Serves as the COOP program point of contact. • Updates COOP Plan as required. 	<p>Planning, Analysis and Mitigation manager</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Review and understand the procedures for emergency evacuation of the existing facility. • Review and understand the responsibilities related to the COOP support functions and performance of essential functions at a continuity site. • Provide current contact information to Division managers. • Develop, update, and test family emergency plans. 	<p>All Division staff</p>

IX. Continuity Logistics

A. Continuity Facilities

DHS&EM evaluated several facilities that could support the continuation of essential services following COOP activation. A risk assessment was conducted on each facility to eliminate those with high vulnerability. Each facility was further evaluated for physical space, reliable infrastructure, adequate communications capability, and to ensure the safety, health and security of employees. As a result of this process, the Division selected a number of alternate facilities.

The annual review of the COOP Plan will include a review of the continuity facilities to ensure that the facilities still meet the current needs. Recommendations will become part of the remedial action process and any shortfalls in the equipment, maintenance, or improvement and modernization of the facilities will be incorporated into the Program Management Plan.

B. Continuity Communications

DHS&EM has identified available and redundant critical communication systems that are located at the continuity facility. Further, the Division maintains fully capable continuity communications that could support organization needs during all hazards, to include pandemic and other related emergencies with support for social distancing operations including telework and other virtual offices. These systems provide the ability to communicate within and outside the organization and are found in Annex B of this Plan.

X. Test, Training, and Exercises (TT&E) Program

DHS&EM maintains a robust TT&E program that complies with the DHS-mandated National Exercise Program, as appropriate. The testing, training, and exercising of continuity capabilities is essential to demonstrating, assessing, and improving the Division's ability to execute its continuity program, plans, and procedures. Training familiarizes continuity personnel with their roles and responsibilities in support of the performance of an organization's essential functions during a continuity event. Tests and exercises serve to assess, validate, or identify for subsequent correction all components of continuity plans, policies, procedures, systems, and facilities used in response to a continuity event.

The Division performs TT&E events at regular intervals in accordance with FCD 1 throughout the year as depicted in the following table:

Continuity TT&E Requirements	Monthly	Quarterly	Annually	As Required
Test and validate equipment to ensure internal and external interoperability and viability of communications systems.	✓			
Test alert, notification, and activation procedures for all continuity personnel.		✓		
Test primary and backup infrastructure systems and services at continuity facilities.			✓	
Test capability to perform MEFs.			✓	
Test plans for recovering vital records, critical information systems, services, and data.			✓	
Test and exercise required physical security capabilities at continuity facilities.			✓	
Test internal and external interdependencies with respect to performance of MEFs.			✓	
Train continuity personnel on roles and responsibilities.			✓	
Conduct continuity awareness briefings or orientation for the entire workforce.			✓	
Train organization's leadership on MEFs and other essential functions.			✓	
Train personnel on all reconstitution plans and procedures.			✓	
Allow opportunity for continuity personnel to demonstrate familiarity with continuity plans and procedures and demonstrate organization's capability to continue essential functions.			✓	
Conduct exercise that incorporates the deliberate and preplanned movement of continuity personnel to continuity facilities.			✓	
Conduct assessment of organization's continuity TT&E programs and continuity plans and programs.			✓	

Continuity TT&E Requirements	Monthly	Quarterly	Annually	As Required
Report findings of all annual assessments as directed to FEMA.			✓	
Conduct successor training for all organization personnel who assume the authority and responsibility of the organization's leadership if that leadership is incapacitated or becomes unavailable during a continuity situation.			✓	
Train on the identification, protection, and ready availability of electronic and hardcopy documents, references, records, information systems, and data management software and equipment needed to support essential functions during a continuity situation for all staff involved in the vital records program.			✓	
Test capabilities for protecting classified and unclassified vital records and for providing access to them from the continuity facility.			✓	
Train on the organization's devolution option for continuity, addressing how the organization will identify and conduct its essential functions during an increased threat situation or in the aftermath of a catastrophic emergency.			✓	
Conduct personnel briefings on continuity plans that involve using or relocating to continuity facilities, existing facilities, or virtual offices.				✓
Allow opportunity to demonstrate intra- and interagency continuity communications capability.				✓
Allow opportunity to demonstrate that backup data and records required for supporting essential functions at continuity facilities are sufficient, complete, and current.				✓
Allow opportunity for continuity personnel to demonstrate their familiarity with the reconstitution procedures to transition from a continuity environment to normal activities.				✓

Continuity TT&E Requirements	Monthly	Quarterly	Annually	As Required
Allow opportunity for continuity personnel to demonstrate their familiarity with agency devolution procedures.				✓

DHS&EM formally documents and reports all conducted continuity TT&E events, including the date of the TT&E event, the type of event, and names of participants. Documentation also includes test results, feedback forms, participant questionnaires, and any other documents resulting from the event. Continuity TT&E documentation is managed by the Division’s Training and Exercise Section. Further, DHS&EM conducts a comprehensive debriefing or hot wash after each exercise, which allows participants to identify systemic weaknesses in plans and procedures and to recommend revisions to organization’s continuity plan. Documentation from TT&E hot washes is maintained by the Division’s Training and Exercise Section.

DHS&EM has developed a Corrective Action Program (CAP) to assist in documenting, prioritizing, and resourcing continuity issues identified during continuity TT&E activities, assessments, and emergency operations. The Division’s CAP incorporates evaluations, after-action reports, and lessons learned from a cycle of events into the development and implementation of its CAP. The Division’s CAP is maintained by the Training and Exercise Section.

DHS&EM’s CAP:

1. Identifies continuity deficiencies and other areas requiring improvement.
2. Provides responsibilities and a timeline for corrective actions.
3. Identifies program, personnel, and funding requirements for submission to upper management.

XI. Multi-Year Strategy and Program Management

DHS&EM management are responsible for the implementation of the DHS&EM’s COOP program. While the COOP Plan serves as the guide during activation and recovery, the COOP program provides the framework and structure to guide continuity of operations planning.

Suggested roles and responsibilities of the Division management include:

- Maintaining documents that grant authority for the creation, modification, ongoing maintenance, and execution of the COOP Plan;
- Identifying issues that will impact the frequency of changes required to the COOP Plan;
- Establishing a review cycle;
- Establishing a testing and exercise cycle; and
- Guiding and prioritizing mitigation activities that the Division needs to undertake.

XII. COOP Plan Maintenance

To maintain viable COOP capabilities, DHS&EM is continually engaged in a process to designate essential functions and resources, define short- and long-term COOP goals and objectives, forecast budgetary requirements, anticipate and address issues and potential obstacles, and establish planning milestones. The Division's Operations Section with direct support of the Planning, Analysis, and Mitigation Section is assigned the task of COOP Plan maintenance.

The following is a list of activities necessary to monitor the dynamic elements of the Division's COOP Plan and the frequency of their occurrence.

Activity	Tasks	Frequency
Update and certify plan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review entire plan for accuracy. Incorporate lessons learned and changes in policy and philosophy. Manage distribution. 	Annually
Maintain orders of succession and delegations of authority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify current incumbents. Update rosters and contact information. 	Semiannually
Maintain emergency relocation site readiness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Check all systems. Verify accessibility. Cycle supplies and equipment, as necessary. 	Monthly
Monitor and maintain vital records management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitor volume of materials. Update/remove files. 	Ongoing
Maintain alternate worksite readiness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Test all systems, IT and communications Verify access codes, systems and contacts. Cycle supplies and equipment if on site. 	Semiannually
Review/update supporting MOUs/MOAs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review MOUs/MOAs for currency and new needs. Incorporate revisions, as required. Obtain signatures of reviewing authorities to confirm validity. 	Annually
Monitor and maintain equipment at alternate sites	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Train users and provide technical assistance as needed. Monitor volume/age of materials and assist users with cycling/updating/removing files. 	On-going

Activity	Tasks	Frequency
Train new key personnel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide orientation. • Schedule participation in training and exercises. 	Within 30 days of appointment
Orient new leadership and senior management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Brief officials on COOP philosophy. • Brief each position on specific COOP responsibilities. 	Within 30 days of appointment
Plan and conduct exercises	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct internal exercises. • Conduct joint exercises with support agencies. • Support and participate in interagency exercises. 	Semiannually Annually or as needed
Maintain security clearances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Obtain, maintain, and update appropriate security clearances for key personnel and COOP team members. 	On-going
Review and Approve COOP Plan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Review COOP Plan changes. 	As needed

Annexes

- Annex A: Essential Functions, Priority, Key Positions, Order of Succession
- Annex B: Continuity Communications
- Annex C: Continuity Facilities
- Annex D: Risk Analysis and Vulnerability Assessment
- Annex E: COOP Decision Matrix
- Annex F: Operational Checklist
- Annex G: Acronyms
- Annex H: Glossary

ANNEX A: Essential Functions, Priority, Key Positions, Orders of Succession

Essential Functions: DHS&EM Operations Essential Functions

1. Essential Function	2. Critical Process or Service	3. Priority / RTO	4. Key Position(s)	5. Successor 1 & Limitations	6. Successor 2 & Limitations	7. Successor 3 & Limitations	8. Successor 4 & Limitations
Provide 24/7 statewide answering point services	Single point of contact for statewide emergency and disaster reporting via telephone, email, satellite phone, ALMR, and NAWAS/AKWAS	1	DHS&EM Operations staff EMS I, II and III (M-F business hours)	MatComm dispatcher/call-taker staff (after hours/weekends) Can only answer PSTN lines if Armory PBX is functioning. MatComm does not currently monitor DHS&EM ALMR, email, fax, or sat phone	DHS&EM duty officer Cannot monitor PBX lines, AKWAS / NAWAS, can only monitor sat phone and AKMR with prior notice	DHS&EM administrative staff (must be capable of operating outside of the SEOC comm. center) Cannot monitor AKWAS/NAWAS	

Essential Functions: DHS&EM Operations Section Essential Functions (cont.)

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.
Essential Function	Critical Process or Service	Priority / RTO	Key Position(s)	Successor 1 & Limitations	Successor 2 & Limitations	Successor 3 & Limitations	Successor 4 & Limitations
Provide 24/7 warning point services	Provide emergency warning through NAWAS / AKWAS, EAS, ALMR, telephone fan-outs	1	DHS&EM Operations staff EMS I, II and III (M-F business hours)	MatComm dispatcher/call-taker staff (after hours/ weekends) Does not monitor DHS&EM ALMR	DHS&EM Duty Officer Does not have remote access to AKWAS / NAWAS. Able to monitor sat phones and ALMR only with prior notice	AST Fairbanks Dispatch Does not monitor DHS&EM ALMR, no access to telephone fan-out procedures/lists	National Weather Service Weather Forecast Office Anchorage Does not monitor DHS&EM ALMR, no access to telephone fan-out procedures/lists
Provide command, control, and coordination of statewide disaster response operations	Fill key staff positions in the State Emergency Operations Center and in the field to support local disaster response efforts as necessary.	1	EPM – IC; EMS III – OSC; EMS II – DIVS and SEOC Response Cell.	EPM 1 (Plans); EMS III (Disaster Assistance); EMS II (Disaster Assistance); Office Assistant II (Program Support) Routine experience in SEOC equipment and response procedures; base and armory access	Any EPM I – IC; any EMS III – OSC; any DHS&EM staff – SEOC Response Cell Lack of depth in training and experience for IC, OSC, and SEOC Response Cell protocols and procedures; base and armory access.		

Essential Functions: DHS&EM Plans Essential Functions

1. Essential Function	2. Critical Process or Service	3. Priority / RTO	4. Key Position(s)	5. Successor 1 & Limitations	6. Successor 2 & Limitations	7. Successor 3 & Limitations	8. Successor 4 & Limitations
Staffing support for SEOC	Get through main gate—provide ops, log, doc, plans.	1	EMS III, EMS II, Program Manager	EMS II	EMAC ICS functionaries		
Critical infrastructure/ key resources intelligence sharing	Access to non-secure and secure information. Ability to work in a secure/non-secure environment.	1	SVA Team Lead	SVA team members			
Plan and conduct SVA	Access to plans, writing of plans, and distribution of plans and planning events.	3	SVA Team Lead	SVA team members			
Plan and conduct hazard mitigation planning	Access to plans, writing of plans, and distribution of plans and planning events. Access to grants information.	4	State Hazard Mitigation Officer (EMS III)	Hazard Mitigation Planner (EMS II)			
Plan and conduct planning	Access to grants administration.	4	Plans Program Manager	Lead Planner (EMS III)	EMAC PA functionaries		
Plan and conduct all hazards planning	Access to plans, writing of plans, and distribution of plans and planning events.	4	Lead Planner (EMS III)	Planner (EMS II)			

Essential Functions: DHS&EM Preparedness Essential Functions

1. Essential Function	2. Critical Process or Service	3. Priority / RTO	4. Key Position(s)	5. Successor 1 & Limitations	6. Successor 2 & Limitations	7. Successor 3 & Limitations	8. Successor 4 & Limitations
Staffing support for SEOC	Get through main gate—provide ops, log, doc, plans.	1	EMS III, EMS II, Preparedness Program Manager	EMSII	EMAC ICS functionaries		
Plan and conduct training	Access to web/electronic enabled training materials.	4	Lead Trainer (EMS III)	Trainer (EMS II)			
Plan and conduct exercises	Access to web/electronic enabled exercise materials.	4	Lead Exercise (EMS III)	Exercise (EMS II)	EMAC PA functionaries		
Plan and conduct outreach	Access to web/electronic enabled outreach materials.	4	Lead Outreach (EMS III)	Outreach (EMS II)			
Plan and conduct preparedness activities	Access to grants administration.	4	Preparedness Program Manager	Exercise (EMS III)	TEMP		

Essential Functions: DHS&EM Disaster Assistance Essential Functions

1. Essential Function	2. Critical Process or Service	3. Priority / RTO	4. Key Position(s)	5. Successor 1 & Limitations	6. Successor 2 & Limitations	7. Successor 3 & Limitations	8. Successor 4 & Limitations
Staffing support for SEOC	Get through main gate—provide ops, log, doc, plans.	1	EMS III, EMS II, DA Program Manager	EMS II	EMAC ICS functionaries		
Support for Essential Functions across the Division	Fill gaps as needed for essential functions across the Division.	2	DA Program Manager, EMS III, EMS II	EMS III	EMS II		
Coordination and provision of training	Provide or ensure training for permanent, temporary, and response corps personnel to support deployment.	2	TS II	TS I	EMS III – within areas of knowledge / expertise	EMS II – within areas of knowledge / expertise	
Staffing support for Immediate Housing Needs	Coordinate with IC/SCO to support immediate housing needs or other response supports as necessary.	2	DA Program Mgr	EMS III	EMS II	EMAC IA functionaries	

Essential Functions: DHS&EM Disaster Assistance Essential Functions (Cont.)

1. Essential Function	2. Critical Process or Service	3. Priority / RTO	4. Key Position(s)	5. Successor 1 & Limitations	6. Successor 2 & Limitations	7. Successor 3 & Limitations	8. Successor 4 & Limitations
Staffing support for temporary housing	Provide temp housing for displaced residents.	3	EMS III	IA/PA EMS II	Any EMS II		

Essential Functions: DHS&EM Program Support Essential Functions

1. Essential Function	2. Critical Process or Service	3. Priority / RTO	4. Key Position(s)	5. Successor 1 & Limitations	6. Successor 2 & Limitations	7. Successor 3 & Limitations	8. Successor 4 & Limitations
Provide command, control, and coordination of statewide disaster response operations	Fill key staff positions in the State Emergency Operations Center and in the field to support local disaster response efforts as necessary.	1	Ops Manager I – IC; Ops EMS III – Deputy IC; Ops EMS II – DIVS; Admin Officer I – Fin Sec Chief; Accountant III (DAS) – Cost Center Specialist; Admin Asst – HR Specialist; Office Assist II – Travel Specialists; Ops Specialist – Liaison: Information Officer – PIO; Procurement Specialist I (DAS) – Procurement; Grants Admin II – Procurement; Grants Admin I – Documentation Unit; Secretary – Human Resources Specialist	Any EPM I – IC; Accountant III (DAS) – Fin Sec Chief; Accountant III (DAS) – Cost Center Specialist; Admin Officer I – HR Specialist; Office Assist II – Travel; Disaster Assistance II – Liaison; Information Officer – PIO; Procurement Specialist I (DAS) – Procurement Routine experience in the State financial system, data collection, & methods; emergency procurement methods; public information management: Joint Information Center; base and armory access	Any Accountant III or II (DAS) – Fin Sec Chief; Any Accountant II (DAS) – Cost Center Specialist; any Procurement Specialist III or I (DAS) – Procurement; any Information Officer III (DMVA) – PIO; Any Office Assist I (DAS) – Travel; any Office Assist I (DAS) – Documentation Unit Lack of depth in training and experience for SEOC protocols and procedures, and initiating JIC protocols.		

Essential Functions: DHS&EM Program Support Essential Functions (cont.)

1. Essential Function	2. Critical Process or Service	3. Priority / RTO	4. Key Position(s)	5. Successor 1 & Limitations	6. Successor 2 & Limitations	7. Successor 3 & Limitations	8. Successor 4 & Limitations
Provide payroll data entry	Input payroll data for staff.	4	Admin Assist I	Office Assist II Providing payroll assistance; initiating payroll requests	Office Assist II Providing payroll assistance; Initiating payroll requests		

ANNEX B: Continuity Communications

Communication System	Support to Essential Function	Current Provider	Specification	Alternate Provider	Special Notes
Non-secure Phones	X	AKNG PBX Service GCI Local and Long Distance	273 total pbx ports 96 trunk lines from GCI MEOC has eight phones lines using VOIP service: <i>four can be used at same time.</i> <i>Rapid Com Trailers- 4 VOEP each</i>	ACS potential, DCO Fort Richardson	10 ports are designed to be emergency PBX failure/bypass lines. NO TSP
Secure Phones	X	AKNG PBX, GCI Local and Long Distance, DHS provided STE and Key	Currently 1 STE in possession of DHS&EM. STU-III and STE available if required through AKNG	ACS potential, DCO Fort Richardson	NO TSP
Fax Lines	X	AKNG PBX Service GCI Local and Long Distance	4 POTS lines in use by DHS&EM ; 2 fax machines and 2 lines connected to FirstClass Unified Messaging	ACS potential, DCO Fort Rich. Fallback to regular fax machines for incoming	NO TSP
Cellular Phones	X	Business Cellular provided by ACS Wireless and GCI	Data/email capabilities if in range of data network	ATT Wireless, GCI Wireless,	DHS&EM leadership utilize personal ATT phones with a State stipend. All internal cells are provided by GCI Wireless via contract for use in bush Alaska.

Communication System	Support to Essential Function	Current Provider	Specification	Alternate Provider	Special Notes
Satellite	X	Satellite telephone provided through Iridium and Globalstar. Accounts held with Sat Com and Global Star.	1 Globalstar in the SEOC. Two methods of satellite communications are available in the MEOC and the Rapid Communication deployable trailers have satellite capability. 12+ Iridium 9505 and 9555 available for field use. Director, Ops Chief, and Operations staff assigned Iridiums for response kits. 8 depolyable back pack kits with BGAN satellite phone	InMarSat	
Email	X	State of Alaska Enterprise Exchange and DMVA FirstClass	SOA Exchange utilized for day-to-day business communications. FirstClass used daily and for comms during disasters. Both are essential.	Private email accounts (I.e. gmail, yahoo, hotmail)	
Internet Access	X	Via SOA WAN and GCI T-1 Mission Control Internet Service	Both utilized for routine and emergency access.	ACS Internet, Satellite Internet, MEOC Wi-Fi, Rapid Com satellite Wi-Fi	SOA and GCI access are provided via different terrestrial paths. Both rely on GCI for access to the internet

Communication System	Support to Essential Function	Current Provider	Specification	Alternate Provider	Special Notes
Data Lines	X	1 T-3 through SOA WAN 1 T-1 through GCI	Both utilized for internet access		SOA T-3 provisioned over SOA SATS microwave from Camp Denali to Tudor Tower. GCI T-1 provided direct over GCI fiber plant. NO TSP
Two-way Radios	X	ALMR Motorola Gold Elite Console for all ALMR channels, Motorola Consolette for ALMR Backup and VHF Comms. FEMA FNARS Radio for HF. All DHS&EM portables and mobiles operate on ALMR and conventional VHF freqs. Amateur radio	1 Console, 2 Consolettes, 3 Mobiles, 20 portables. MEOC and Rapid Con Trailers with ALMR base and deployable portables, SEOC and MEOC have amateur radios	Redundant radios installed (ALMR, VHF, HF) in Alternate Communications Building. MEOC and Rapid Com Trailers	

Communication System	Support to Essential Function	Current Provider	Specification	Alternate Provider	Special Notes
GETS Cards	X	DHS/NCS	Currently issued to DHS&EM leadership, duty officers, and SEOC manager	No alternate provider.	

Alaska DHS&EM
State Emergency Operations Center

Physical: 49000 Army Guard Road, Suite A-19
JBER, AK 99505-5750

Telephone: 907-428-7100 Primary
907-428-7000 Secondary

Fax: 907-428-7095 Primary Fax
907-428-7009 Secondary Fax

Electronic Mail: seoc@ak-prepared.com - Primary
response@ak-prepared.com - Secondary
mva.dhsem.operations@alaska.gov -Tertiary

Alternative Methods:

ALMR: State ICS Zone, CMD 1

NAWAS: Alaska Warning Point FEMA National Radio System (ALE address 100, call sign WGY 980)

ANNEX C: Continuity Facilities

All alternate continuity facility information is located in a separate document for internal DHS&EM use only.

ANNEX D: Risk Analysis and Vulnerability Assessment

THREAT EVENT/ HAZARD	HISTORICAL <i>Based on the number of occurrences on a regional basis</i>	PROBABILITY <i>Relative likelihood this will occur</i>	SEVERITY = MAGNITUDE of IMPACTS						SEVERITY IMPACTS <i>Overall Impact (Average)</i>	RELATIVE RISK <i>Historical + Probability x Impact Severity</i>
			HUMAN IMPACT <i>Potential deaths or injuries</i>		FACILITIES IMPACT <i>Physical damage and costs</i>		BUSINESS IMPACT <i>Interruption in services. Need to relocate on temp or permanent basis.</i>			
			<i>Direct impact to people in facility</i>	<i>Indirect to people in the region from an event</i>	<i>Direct damages to the facility</i>	<i>Indirect damages from a regional event</i>	<i>Interruption of services</i>	<i>Extent of required relocation</i>		
Hazards Natural, Technological, Human, Terrorism	<i>1 = Not occurred 2 = 1 in 50-100 years 3 = 1 in 11-50 years 4 = 1 in 5-10 years 5 = 1 in 1-4 years</i>	<i>1 = Not occur 2 = Doubtful 3 = Possible 4 = Probable 5 = Inevitable</i>							<i>1 = Lowest 5 = Highest</i>	<i>1 = Lowest 25 = Highest</i>
Natural										
Avalanche *	4	3	1	2	1	1	1	1	1.17	4.08
Earthquake (Magnitude 5.0+) *	5	4	2	2	2	2	3	3	2.33	10.50
Extreme Cold *	3	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00	3.00
Fire: Forest /Wildland /Urban Interface *	5	3	1	1	1	2	3	3	2.00	8.00
Flooding (All Types) *	3	3	1	1	1	2	2	1	1.33	4.00
Landslide *	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1.17	1.17
Lightning	3	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00	3.00
Thunderstorm(severe) / Wind Storm *	3	3	1	2	1	2	2	2	1.67	5.00
Tsunamis *	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1.17	1.75
Winter Storms *	3	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00	3.00
Volcanic Eruption *	4	4	1	2	2	2	3	2	2.00	8.00
Technological										
Building Structure Collapse	3	2	3	2	3	2	4	5	3.17	7.92
Chemical Release	2	2	1	2	1	1	3	2	1.67	3.33
Computer/IT Failure	2	3	1	1	1	1	3	2	1.50	3.75
Dam Failure *	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00	2.00
Extreme Air Pollution (Ash, Smoke, etc)	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2.00	6.00
Fire/Explosion	2	3	3	3	3	1	4	5	3.17	7.92
Fuel Shortage	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1.17	2.33
Hazardous Materials Accident: Transportation or Storage *	2	3	2	2	2	2	1	1	1.67	4.17
Natural Gas Leak	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2.00	3.00
Nuclear Hazard Release	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00	1.00
Pipeline Break/Damage	1	1	1	1	3	1	3	3	2.00	2.00
Power Outage	3	3	2	1	1	1	1	1	1.17	3.50
Power/Utility Failure	3	2	1	2	1	1	2	2	1.50	3.75
Radioactive Accident	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00	1.00
Transportation Accident: Motor Vehicle, Rail, Marine Vessel, Aircraft *	4	3	1	2	1	1	2	2	1.50	5.25
Human-induced Hazards										
Arson	4	2	3	3	3	1	3	3	2.67	8.00
Biological Warfare	1	1	1	1	3	3	5	5	3.00	3.00
Bombing *	1	1	1	1	3	3	5	5	3.00	3.00
Chemical Warfare	1	1	1	1	3	3	5	5	3.00	3.00
Economic Emergency *	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1.17	2.33
Enemy Attack	1	1	3	3	3	3	5	5	3.67	3.67
Hostage Incident	2	2	2	1	1	1	3	3	1.83	3.67
Active Shooter	1	1	2	1	1	1	3	3	1.83	1.83
Large-scale Strike	1	1	3	3	3	3	5	5	3.67	3.67
Nuclear Warfare	1	1	3	3	3	3	5	5	3.67	3.67
Protest/Demonstration *	2	2	1	1	1	1	3	2	1.50	3.00

THREAT EVENT/ HAZARD	HISTORICAL <i>Based on the number of occurrences on a regional basis</i>	PROBABILITY <i>Relative likelihood this will occur</i>	SEVERITY = MAGNITUDE of IMPACTS						SEVERITY IMPACTS <i>Overall Impact (Average)</i>	RELATIVE RISK <i>Historical + Probability x Impact Severity</i>
			HUMAN IMPACT <i>Potential deaths or injuries</i>		FACILITIES IMPACT <i>Physical damage and costs</i>		BUSINESS IMPACT <i>Interruption in services. Need to relocate on temp or permanent basis.</i>			
Hazards Natural, Technological, Human, Terrorism	<i>1 = Not occurred 2 = 1 in 50-100 years 3 = 1 in 11-50 years 4 = 1 in 5-10 years 5 = 1 in 1-4 years</i>	<i>1 = Not occur 2 = Doubtful 3 = Possible 4 = Probable 5 = Inevitable</i>	<i>Direct impact to people in facility</i>	<i>Indirect to people in the region from an event</i>	<i>Direct damages to the facility</i>	<i>Indirect damages from a regional event</i>	<i>Interruption of services</i>	<i>Extent of required relocation</i>	<i>1 = Lowest 5 = Highest</i>	<i>1 = Lowest 25 = Highest</i>
Human-induced Hazards (continued)										
Public Health Emergency (Panflu,RSV, etc.) *	3	3	2	2	1	1	2	1	1.50	4.50
Riot/Civil Disturbance *	2	2	1	1	1	1	3	1	1.33	2.67
Sabotage in Private	3	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	1.33	3.33
Special Events (such as International Events, Conferences, Special	5	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00	3.50
Terrorism										
Terrorist Act *	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	5	3.33	10.00
Biological *	1	1	3	3	3	3	5	5	3.67	3.67
Chemical *	1	1	3	3	3	3	5	5	3.67	3.67
Explosion *	1	1	3	3	3	3	5	5	3.67	3.67
Nuclear/Radiological *	1	1	3	3	3	3	5	5	3.67	3.67
AVERAGE SCORE	2	2.07	1.65	1.72	1.76	1.67	2.76	2.61	2.03	4.41

RISK ANALYSIS AND VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT FOR COOP

Instruction for Completion

Introduction:

Completion of this risk analysis and vulnerability assessment matrix is one of the first steps in creating or reviewing a Continuity of Operations Plan.

This risk analysis (RA) requires input by various members of the community including public and private partners. *It is strongly recommended that you do not complete the RA alone* but rather as a member of a COOP planning team. If you don't have such a team, form one before completing this risk assessment exercise.

Generic threats to our building(s) may be taken for granted, e.g., fires, traffic accidents, accidents involving transport of people, hazardous materials, and building collapse. This assessment process reviews, re-evaluates, and notes the generic hazards, including any features specific to the building(s) and region, then adds the hazards that are specific to your local area. These hazards fall into four categories:

1. Natural
2. Technological
3. Civil (including terrorism)
4. Transportation

Methodology:

Each hazard present in the area is selected and rated. Information is entered in the automated Excel spreadsheet using straightforward calculations. Any irrelevant hazards on the list should be left blank and new applicable hazards may be added to produce a complete list.

List impacts and frequencies for each identified risk to assist in subsequent planning, training, and exercises. Risks, hazards, and vulnerabilities to the facility and their likely point of impact will emerge from this assessment.

This crucial examination of the impact of the risks and hazards identified will serve as the foundation of developing or improving a COOP Plan, an emergency operations plan, a hazard mitigation plan, a building emergency plan, and a multi-year exercise plan. The severity of consequences to life and health, property and infrastructure, and the environment are part of this evaluation, along with the likelihood of occurrence. The results will influence preparedness planning.

Impact:

The impacts of each hazard event should be considered, including impacts to life, health and residual welfare of a community; social/environmental impact, such as disruption and displacement of people affected by the event; environmental impact on the physical area; economic impact in terms of costs of property and infrastructure damage; and recovery costs or loss of revenue streams.

It is also important to take into account the potential for escalation of an event or the “domino effect” when combined with other hazards. A simple approach to assessing the likelihood of an event or escalation involves taking into account the judgment of the people involved in this field rather than focusing solely on mathematical analysis.

The spreadsheet provides a means of recording information about the potential impact and probability of each risk and hazard, with a view to identify a likely position on the risk matrix. Prevention, control, and mitigation measures already in place or planned will help in mitigation and management of these risks.

Probability & Severity Metric:

The following questions will help determine the likelihood and severity of hazard events that may affect your facility.

A. Historical (Frequency)

The scoring is based on the number of events that have occurred at the facility or in the region. It will take some investigation using a number of sources to determine this number. The region includes Anchorage, Eagle River, and communities in the Matanuska Susitna Valley. Scoring is as follows:

- 1 - If this event has never occurred
- 2 - If there was one occurrence every 51 - 100 years
- 3 - If there was one occurrence every 11 - 50 years
- 4 - If there was one occurrence every 5 - 10 years
- 5 - If there was one occurrence every 1 - 5 years

B. Probability of Occurrence

This score is based on the statistical probability of the hazard occurring in a given year. This may be obtained by scientific research or simply by an educated guess. The higher the probability, the higher the score entered.

Scoring is as follows:

- 1 - Not applicable (will not occur)
- 2 - Doubtful (not likely)
- 3 - Possible (could occur)
- 4 - Probable (very likely to occur)
- 5 - Inevitable (will occur)

Note that information was taken from the approved State of Alaska, Hazard Mitigation Plan, the Municipality of Anchorage, Hazard Mitigation Plan, and the Matanuska Susitna Borough Hazard Mitigation Plan to complete this section.

Severity and Impact

Human Impact

Part 1: There are two questions in this section. First, what was the extent of injuries and deaths during previous events? Second, if there is a probability of this event occurring what might be the extent of injuries and deaths in the building?

- 1 - None
- 2 - Few minor injuries
- 3 - Multiple minor injuries or a major injury
- 4 - Multiple major injuries or a death
- 5 - Multiple deaths and major injuries

Part 2: Consider the potential for injuries or deaths to staff and families should this occur anywhere in the region. Example: An earthquake may have no direct effect on the building or staff but could have a direct impact on employees and families that are at home.

- 1 - None
- 2 - Few minor injuries
- 3 - Multiple minor injuries or possible major injury
- 4 - Multiple major injuries or possible death
- 5 - Multiple deaths and major injuries

Facilities Impact

Part 1: Consider the vulnerability of the facility to each event and estimate the extent of probable damage.

- 1 - Little or no damage
- 2 - Mild damage to the facility
- 3 - Moderate damage to the facility
- 4 - Severe damage to the facility
- 5 - Extensive damage to the facility

Part 2: Consider the potential damage to the facility should this event occur in the region. Example: A distant wildfire would have no significant impact to the facility but should the wind change and the fire expand, the facility could be threatened.

- 1 - Little or no damage
- 2 - Mild damage to the facility
- 3 - Moderate damage to the facility
- 4 - Severe damage to the facility
- 5 - Extensive damage to the facility

Business Impact

Part 1: If this event occurred in the facility, estimate the duration of interruption to activities and business operations.

- 1 - Hours
- 2 - Days
- 3 - Weeks
- 4 - Months
- 5 - Years or longer

Part 2: To what extent would this event require the activation of COOP and/or the relocation to an alternate facility?

- 1 - None
- 2 - Minor
- 3 - Moderate, selected sections with support
- 4 - Significant, selected sections would be relocated with support
- 5 - Full, all sections would be relocated with support

For each threat event, the probability and impact estimates from the Option Finder voting tool are combined [(historical + probability x impact)] to quantify the relative risk of each threat event. The relative risk provides a basis to identify and evaluate existing mitigation and recovery efforts to determine if there are significant facility vulnerabilities.

All six estimates for impact are averaged to produce an overall severity score. The assumption is that threat events affecting all three impact categories would have greater overall impact to the facility and its operations than events whose impacts are limited to one or two impacts. The overall severity score and the probability are combined to create a relative risk score for each threat event.


Once all the threat events have been evaluated, the results are sorted from high to low to produce a relative risk ranking of threat exposures. The results of this risk analysis should provide a basis to evaluate adequacy of mitigation measures and recovery planning for the most significant threats.

For each threat event, answer one question representing history and probability of occurrence, and then evaluate six impact questions across three different categories (human impact, facilities impact and business impact).

SEVERITY=MAGNITUDE of IMPACTS									
Threat Event/Hazard	Historical	Probability	Human Impact	Facilities Impact	Business Impact	Severity Impacts	Relative Risk		
	Based on the number of occurrences in the region	Relative likelihood this will occur	Potential deaths or injuries	Physical damage and costs	Interruption to services. Need to relocate on a temp. or permanent basis	Overall impact (average)	Historical + probability x impact severity		
Hazards	1 - Not occurred 2 - 1 every 51- 100 yrs 3 - 1 every 11-50 yrs 4 - 1 every 5-10 yrs 5 - 1 every 1-4 yrs	1 – Not Occur 2 – Doubtful 3 – Possible 4 – Probable 5 – Inevitable	Direct impact on people in facility	Direct impact to the facility	Impact on services	1 = Lowest	1 = Lowest		
Natural									
Technological									
Human					Indirect impact to people in the region from the event	Indirect impact to the facility from a regional event	Extent of required relocation	5 = Highest	25 = Highest
Terrorism									

This model was developed based upon the Disaster Resistant California Community Colleges, Risk and Vulnerability Assessment

ANNEX E: COOP Decision Matrix



ANNEX F: OPERATIONAL CHECKLISTS

Activation, Relocation, and Continuity Operations

Operational checklists for COOP activation, relocation, and continuity operations are maintained by, and available in the SEOC. The checklists cover the following contingencies:

- CONTINGENCY #1: JBER basement SEOC becomes unavailable during DHS&EM working hours but JBER National Guard Armory/upstairs DHS&EM offices intact
- CONTINGENCY #2: JBER basement SEOC unavailable during DHS&EM non-working hours but JBER National Guard Armory/upstairs DHS&EM offices intact
- CONTINGENCY #3: JBER National Guard Armory becomes unavailable during DHS&EM working hours but JBER intact
- CONTINGENCY #4: JBER National Guard Armory unavailable during DHS&EM non-working hours but Mat-Su and Anchorage transportation system intact
- CONTINGENCY #5: JBER National Guard Armory unavailable during DHS&EM non-working hours and Mat-Su and Anchorage transportation compromised
- CONTINGENCY #6: JBER National Guard Armory unavailable during DHS&EM non-working hours and unanticipated and/or temporary site is employed
- CONTINGENCY #7: Normal (roadway) transportation routes for DHS&EM/liaison staff to SEOC compromised and alternate transportation methods to SEOC required

ANNEX G: ACRONYMS

AAR	After Action Report
CAP	Corrective Action Program
CGC	Continuity Guidance Circular
COOP	Continuity of Operations Plan
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DHS&EM	State of Alaska, Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management
EAS	Emergency Alert System
EMAP	Emergency Management Accreditation Program
ERS	Emergency Relocation Site
FCD	Federal Continuity Directive
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FNARS	FEMA National Radio System
HSEEP	Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program
HSPD	Homeland Security Presidential Directive
GETS	Government Emergency Telecommunications Service
ICS	Incident Command System
IP	Improvement Plan
IT	Information Technology
MEF	Mission Essential Functions
NFPA	National Fire Protection Association
NIMS	National Incident Management System
RTO	Recovery Time Objectives
SEOC	State of Alaska Emergency Operations Center
TSP	Telecommunications Service Priority
TT&E	Testing, Training, and Exercises

ANNEX H – Glossary

Activation – When all or a portion of the COOP Plan has been put into motion

All-hazards – Spectrum of all types of hazards including accidents, technological events, natural disasters, terrorist attacks, warfare, and chemical, biological including pandemic influenza, radiological, nuclear, or explosive events

After Action Report – Formal document intended to serve as an aid to performance evaluation and improvement by registering situation-response interactions, analyzing critical procedures, determining their effectiveness and efficiency, and proposing adjustments and recommendations

Continuity of Operations – Effort within individual agencies to ensure they can continue to perform their MEFs during a wide range of emergencies, including localized acts of nature, accidents, and technological or attack-related emergencies

Continuity Facility – Location, other than the original facility, used to process data and/or conduct essential functions in the event of a disaster, loss of facility use, or personnel shortages. See Emergency Relocation Site (ERS)

Continuity of Operations (COOP) Plan – Set of documented procedures developed to provide for the continuance of essential business functions during an emergency

COOP Event – Any event or action which renders the primary worksite incapacitated and requires a full or partial activation of the COOP Plan

Corrective Action Program (CAP) – Program to assist in documenting, prioritizing, and resourcing continuity issues identified during continuity TT&E activities, assessments, and emergency operations. The CAP incorporates evaluations, after-action reports, and lessons learned from a cycle of events

Delegations of Authority – Pre-delegated authorities for making policy determinations and decisions at headquarters, field levels, and other organizational locations

Essential Functions – Critical activities performed by organizations especially after a disruption of normal activities. Mission Essential Functions (MEFs) are one category of essential functions

Essential Resources – Resources that support the organization’s ability to provide vital services, exercise civil authority, maintain the safety and well-being of the general populace, and sustain the nation’s industrial and economic bases during an emergency

Emergency Relocation Site (ERS) – Remote continuity facility to which the agency moves to continue MEFs and other identified essential functions in the event the traditional work site is incapacitated

Facilities – Locations where an organization’s leadership and staff operate. Leadership and staff may be collocated in one facility or dispersed across many locations and connected by communications systems. Facilities should provide staff with survivable protection and enable continued and enduring operations - may be mobile or temporarily constructed

Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) – Federal program that prioritizes calls over wireline networks

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) – Threat and performance-based exercise program developed by the Department of Homeland Security that provides doctrine and policy for planning, conducting, and evaluating exercises. Developed to enhance and assess terrorism prevention, response, and recovery capabilities at the federal, state, and local levels

Implementation Procedure Checklist – List of the immediate actions to take as the COOP Plan is implemented

Information Technology (IT) – Applied computer systems, both hardware and software, and often including networking and telecommunications. Usually in the context of a business or other enterprise

Interoperability – Ability of systems, personnel, or agencies to provide services to and accept services from other systems, personnel, or agencies and to use these services to operate effectively together. This word can also be used to describe the condition achieved among electronic communication systems or items of electronic communication equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them

Interoperable Communications – Alternate communications that provide the capability to perform essential functions, in conjunction with other agencies, until normal operations can be resumed

Improvement Plan – Plan developed as a result of an After Action Report which identifies specific corrective actions, assigns them to responsible parties, and establishes target dates for completion

Key Personnel – Personnel designated by their division as critical to the resumption of essential functions and services

Legal and Financial Records – Records that are needed to protect the legal and financial rights of the transportation agency and of the persons affected by its actions

Mission Essential Functions (MEFs) – Limited set of organization level functions to be continued throughout, or resumed rapidly after, a disruption of normal activities

National Continuity Policy – Establishes a comprehensive national course of action for the continuity of government and supporting private sector structures and operations

National Exercise Program (NEP) – Nation’s overarching exercise program formulated by the National Security Council / Homeland Security Council and executed by the Federal Interagency Council. All interagency partners have adopted HSEEP as the methodology for all exercises that will be conducted as part of the NEP

Normal Operations – Broad functions undertaken by an organization when it is assigned responsibility for a given functional area; these functions include planning and execution of tasks throughout the range of operations

Orders of Succession – Provisions for the assumption of senior agency offices during an emergency in the event that any of those officials are unavailable to execute their legal duties

Plan – Proposed or intended method of getting from one set of circumstances to another. A plan is often used to move from the present situation towards the achievement of one or more objectives or goals

Reconstitution – Process by which agency personnel resume normal business operations in the original or replacement primary operating facility

Recovery – All types of emergency actions dedicated to the continued protection of the public or to promoting the resumption of normal activities in the affected area

Recovery Time Objective (RTO) – Period of time in which systems, applications, or functions must be recovered after an outage

Response – Activities and programs designed to address the immediate and short-term effects of the onset of an emergency or disaster

Risk Analysis – Evaluation of the probability that certain disruptions will occur and the identification of controls to reduce organizational exposure to such risks

Test, Training, and Exercises (TT&E) – Measures to ensure that an agency's COOP program is capable of supporting the continued execution of its essential functions throughout the duration of a COOP activation

Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP) – Federal program that directs telecommunications providers (wireline or wireless phone companies) to give preferential treatment when they need to add new lines or restore systems following a disruption of services regardless of cause

Vital Databases – Information systems needed to support essential functions during a COOP situation

Vital Records – Electronic and/or hardcopy documents, references, and records needed to support essential functions during a COOP situation. The two basic categories of vital records are emergency operating records and legal and financial records

Vulnerability Analysis – Process that defines, identifies, and classifies the susceptibility of a facility, computer, network, or communications infrastructure to damage or destruction